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ABSTRAK
Kajian ini menilai rasional ekonomi untuk mengganti juruaudit oleh firma-firma tersenarai
dengan meneliti kesan keputusan ini terhadap perubahan harga saham firma-firma tersebut (atau
dikenali juga sebagai kesan hana). Keputusan pihak pengurusan firma untuk mengekal atau
menggantikan juruaudit ini melibatkan satu perubahan ke atas firma-firma audit yang berbeza
kualiti. Kualiti audit ditakrifkan dengan mengklasifikasikan firma-firma audit kepada firma-firma
Tahap 1 (Big-5) dan firma-firma Tahap 2 (bukan-Big 5). Ciri yang membezakan antara dua
kumpulan produk audit dipercayai menjadi kredibiliti yang dibawa oleh setiap kumpulan dalam
perjanjian audit. Faktor-faktor yang berhubung dengan pilihan firma audit dan perubahan untuk
ciri-ciri firma berkaitan pilihan juruaudit disiasat menggunakan model regresi logistik. Hasil
kajian menunjukkan bahawa penggantian juruaudit oleh firma-firma tersenarai sebahagiannya
diterangkan oleh perubahan dalam pengurusan dan pertumbuhan perolehan. Perubahan dalam
ciri-ciri firma seperti pertumbuhan aset, pembelian aset tetap kepada jumlah aset, kemampuan
mempengaruhi orang lain dan perubahan dalam aktiviti kewangan menerangkan penggantian
juruaudit. Hal ini menunjukkan tiada bukti kesan harta signifikan daripada pengumuman
penggantian juruaudit.
ABSTRACT
This article examines the economic rationale for auditor change by Malaysian listed firms by
examining audit switch effect on share prices. The auditor change decision by management to
retain or to change involves a switch across audit firms with different quality. Audit quality is
defined by classifying the audit firms into Tier 1 (Big-5) firms and Tier 2 (non-Big 5) firms. The
distinguishing attribute between the two groups of audit products is believed to be the credibility
that each group brings to the audit engagement. Factors associated with the choice of audit firm
and changes for firm characteristics associated with auditor choice were investigated using the
logistic regression model. The findings show that the auditor switch of Malaysian listed firms is
partly explained by changes in management and turnover growth. Changes in firms' characteristics
such as asset growth, purchase of fixed asset to total asset, leverage and changes in financing
activities explain auditor switches. There appears to be no evidence of significant wealth effect
from auditor switch announcements.
INTRODUCTION
Accounting literature on auditor change decision
and its implications on firm's value, credibility
of financial reporting and cost of monitoring
management activities is well documented in the
literature emanating from the developed
countries. Auditor switch decision involves
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change of incumbent auditor resulting in the
choice of quality differentiated audit firms to
realign the characteristics of the audit firm with
the growing needs of clients under changing
circumstances. Changes in management,
perceived expertise of audit firms and
deterioration of financial health of clients have
been found to be associated with auditor change/
switch decisions. Changes in a firm's activities
and perception of advances in audit technology
have been shown to be associated with the choice
of quality differentiated audit firms.
Changes in management might result in
replacement of the incumbent auditor with a
view to imbibe fresh ideas to enhance the firm's
expansion policy under a changed management.
Similarly, auditor replacement will be initiated if
the existing audit firm lacks the expertise to
keep up with the firm's expansion policies and
its changed internal control systems. Firms
experiencing consistent deterioration in
performance may also decide to replace the
incumbent audit firm with a more compliant
auditor in an attempt to evade a qualified report
detrimental to the value of the firm.
Change in firm's activities (expansion,
contraction, financing, performance, etc.) and
audit technology creates demand for the choice
of quality differentiated audit firms. The rationale
for choosing a relatively higher quality audit
firm might be due to the growing needs of the
firm, to take advantage of the audit firm's
reputation. The choice of a lower quality audit
firm might be prompted by a sudden contraction
of business activities, to gain an ability to
negotiate audit comments to reflect
management's view rather than an unsolicited
"fair view" as well as a desire to lower costs of
engaging audit services.
Due to asymmetry of information between
principals and management, management of
growing firms might redirect resources, as
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits on the
job, at the expense of shareholders. The
shareholders have to incur costs to ensure that
management's activities are consistent with
shareholders' objectives. Management of highly
levered firms might be tempted to transfer wealth
from their shareholders by engaging in risky
investments beyond that sanctioned by
shareholders. Engaging relatively higher quality
audit firms mitigates against these agency costs
elements of management but which are
ultimately borne by shareholders.
Revaluation effect of auditor switch has been
an issue of interest among investors and unlike
corporate dividend and earnings announcements,
which reflect a real change in expected corporate
performance, auditor change announcements
convey no direct apparent economic information.
The economic effect from the latter event is the
signal associated with different investors'
interpretation about the quality of audit services
provided by the auditor. Investors are observed
to utilise the auditor change/switch
announcements to revise their expectation of
the firm's expected future cash flows, and hence
its share prices. A change to higher prestige
auditors might be perceived as an improvement
in audit services and hence an expected positive
revaluation effect may result. Similarly, a change
to lower prestige audit firms might be perceived
as negative news. Evidence (Nichols and Smith
1983; Eichensher et at. 1989) suggests that larger
audit firms provide higher quality audit services
by offering greater credibility to clients' financial
statements than the small audit firms.
Though there is substantial documentation
on determinants and revaluation effect of auditor
switch announcements in developed markets,
there is a hardly any documented evidence on
similar issues in developing markets, like
Malaysia. This research examines the
determinants and the revaluation effect of
auditor change announcements of firms listed
on the KLSE. Section 2 presents literature on
the economic rational for auditor switch. Section
3 provides discussion on methodology and data
collection. Section 3 is further divided into test
model, abnormal returns measures and statistical
tests. Section 4 provides discussion on findings
for simple parametric test, logistics regression
and event study methodology. The final section
summarises the findings of the paper.
liTERATURE REVIEW
The theory of the firm as amended to include
Agency Problem emphasises the importance of
monitoring management activities. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) suggest that auditing is one
monitoring device that can mitigate agency costs,
implying a need for independent audit services.
Based on Watts and Zemmerman's (1978) work,
DeAngelo (1981a; 1981b) developed a demand
and supply rationale for audit quality. Audit
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quality is defined as the probability that an
auditor will both discover the breach of contract
(material mis-statement) and subsequently
actually report it. It is implied that auditors
specialise in supplying various level of audit
quality and audit firm size is an effective surrogate
for audit quality. Firms change their auditors to
ensure a desired quality of audit service.
An analogy from product differentiated
hypothesis is that firms use auditor choice as a
signalling device to reveal their desirable
characteristics. Investors incorporate the arrival
of new information (choice of quality auditor)
and re-evaluate the firm's value. Investors are
willing to pay a relatively higher price for better
performing firms. Holthausen and Verrecchia
(1990) suggest that firms appear to signal their
ex ante uncertainty by hiring a higher prestige
audit firm to perform their audit. This signal is
credible to the market since the auditor's
compensation is higher exhibiting firm-specific
reputation capital. Firms with unfavourable
information would prefer a lower quality auditor.
The literature on auditor change
documented in the developed markets offers
several explanations for factors affecting both
switching and its affect on share revaluation.
Early work on these issues by Burton and Robert
(1967) and Carpenter and Strawser (1971)
provide evidence on the determinants of auditor
switch decisions. They documented a positive
relationship from changes in management,
changes in new financing and switching auditor.
Qualified audit reports are important in
determining auditor switch. Managers
strategically use switch decisions to avoid any
unfavourable information release to investors
(Chow and Rice 1982; Crawswelll988; Dye 1991;
Citron and Tafler 1992). However, the findings
of Gul et at. (1991) and Takia et at. (1993) did
not support this notion. Other factors include
the demand for additional audit service (Burton
and Robert 1967; Lurie 1977), firms' growth
(Lingbeck and Rogow 1978), financial distress
(Schwart and Menon 1985; Dhaliwal and
Schwartzberg 1993), and the importance of audit
fee to corporate management decision
(Bedingfield and Loeb 1974; Ettredge and
Greenburg 1990).
There is evidence of a significant relationship
between firm size, growth and choice of auditor
(Healy and Lys 1986; Johnson and Lys 1986;
Simunic and Stein 1987). In general, firm size
increases contribute to agency costs since it
creates a vast .opportunity for managers to
consume non-pecuniary benefits thus resulting
in a demand for a quality audit firms (Tier 1)
(Fama andJensen (1983a; 1983b)). Alternatively,
Johnson and Lys (1986) argue that fixed
investment in the auditor error detection
technology leads to specialisation in market
segment and difference in technologies and cost
function across market segments are likely to be
reflected by difference in audit firm's size
(Francis and Wilson 1988). Palmrose (1984),
Eichenseher and Shields (1986), Johnson and
Lys (1990) showed a positive association between
leverage and choice ofTier 1; negative association
for Tier 1 audit firms which underwent merger
activities (Healy and Lys 1986). Healy and Lys
also assert that clients who issue new debt
securities remain with Tier 1 audit firms to take
advantage of its reputation and thereby lower
investors' information costs in assessing the
investment quality. Francis and Wilson (1988)
provide support for an hypothesised association
between agency costs and choice of brand name
after controlling for growth and client size.
Evidence of market reaction on auditor
switch decision is inconclusive. Fried and Schiff
(1981) examined the disclosure requirement by
SEC and the degree of market reaction to such
disclosures surrounding the auditor changes.
The findings suggest a negative effect on average.
The literature offers several explanations for
negative revisions in stock prices, which, among
others include, substantial direct and indirect
cost associated with auditor switch and investor
perception of poor economic prospect of firm's
operating, financing and performance. Dupuch
and Simunic (1982) suggest that firms switching
to higher prestige audit firms will yield a positive
response while switching to lower prestige audit
firms will have negative response from market
participants.
Smith and Nichole (1982) documented a
dispute over accounting and auditing principles
with auditors prior to the auditor switch and
those of client firms which did not disclose any
dispute. A systematic price decline was reported
surrounding the auditor switch for a client firm
which reported a dispute with the auditor.
Johnson and Lys (1990) examined the
market reaction to voluntary auditor changes
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and reported no price reaction. Davidson and
Gribbin (1995) documented a negative abnormal
return to the announcement of auditor change
and postulated that it might be due to the
market's lack of confidence about the motive
for the change. John et al. (1999) showed a
negative market reaction to auditor resignation
and suggested that auditor resignation from
office is likely to be a cost signal for ~udit firms
particularly when a client firm is a listed company.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
One hundred and thirty-five firms that switched
their auditors over the period 1986 to 1996 were
sampled. The complete data set for all analysis
was available for 108 firms. The sample was
verified using annual reports and announcement
dates for auditor changes were obtained from
the minutes of the annual general meeting. The
revaluation effect of auditor switch was analysed
using stock prices and Composite Index values
extracted from the daily diary of KLSE.
Following Zurada et al. (1998), the logistic
regression model is used to analyse the decision
to change, retain auditor or (switch to higher
or lower prestige audit firms). This model avoids
normality assumptions when the dependent
variable is dichotomous and produces highest
classification accuracy for the traditional
dichotomous response variables. The functional
form of a logistic cumulative density function:
P (Y= 11X) = exp (~J\ Xk)/[1+exp(I~kXk)]
(1)
The unknown parameters (ex, ~) are
estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimators
(MLE) in contrast to ordinary regression models
which are estimated by the method of Least
Squares Estimators (OLS). Since the likelihood
equations for logit equations are non-linear in
the parameters to be estimated, algebraic
solutions are not obtainable and therefore
approximation by standard iterative algorithms
is used.
Test Model
Parametric Test
The parametric test of the differences in the
mean value of the characteristics of sampled
firms (firms changing their audit firms) and
control firms (client firms that did not change
their audit firms) was conducted. The
characteristics are turnover, average asset,
acquisition, of fixed asset return on asset, leverage
and liquidity position of the firms. A similar test
was also conducted to examine the difference
among client firms associated with quality
differentiated audit firms.
Auditor Change Model
The stepwise logistic regression technique was
selected to ascertain the important determinants
of audit switch decision. The functional form of
the regression equation is as follows:
Z= A with A = 1 or 0 indicating that a client firm
did (1) or did not switch auditors (0). X = the
variables identified for the model. These are
management change (MGTCH), average
acquisition of fixed asset to total asset (ACQUI),
turnover growth (GROWTH) both prior and
after the auditor switch, liquidity (LIQ), firms
leverage (LEV), average returns on asset (AROA) ,
average earnings per share (EPS) , qualified audit
report both prior and after the auditor switch.
Change in management could serve as
principal-agents contractual arrangement as new
management could demand for the replacement
of an incumbent auditor with a new one with
whom it has favorable dealings in the past and
who will bring new ideas that is instrumental to
the firm's expansion policy. This is measured by
taking value of one if there is a change in
management or zero otherwise. Rapid growth
could be a measure of principal-agent contract.
Clients who are constantly acquiring subsidiaries
and expanding into new markets would demand
new auditors who are more effective in
discharging auditing service. Rapid growth is
measured by percentage changes in turnover
growth three years prior and three years after
the auditor switch. Auditor effectiveness is
measured by the size of the audit firm, that is
whether the audit firm is a member of higher
prestige auditor or otherwise prior to the auditor
change. This measured by taking the value of
one if pre-switch audit firm was a member of
higher quality (Tier 1) audit firm or 0 for
othenvise. Client firms whose reputation is
tarnished by its poor performance, corporate
management will try to change auditors to avoid
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where
Y = 1 indicating firms switching to higher
Jprestige (Tier 1) audit firms and 0 indicates
firms switching to less prestige (Tier 2) audit
firms.
X = predictor (independent) variables, and
cJ.'I' f..2, f..3,···, \): the coefficient of the predictor
variables.
Auditor Choice Model
The analysis of the firms' characteristics and the
direction of auditor changes (Tier 2 to Tier 1
audit firms and vice versa) are done using logistic
regression model. Previous studies (Johnson and
Lys 1990; Francis and Wilson 1988) used similar
models to determine the characteristics of the
firms which are associated with direction of the
auditor changes. The hypothesised relationship
may be expressed as follows:
any unfavourable information disseminated to
the capital market. A qualified report, average
return on asset, average earnings per share and
liquidity of the firms are used as proxy for
client's reputation. Qualified audit report is a
binary variable which takes the value of 1 if
auditor issued qualified report one or two years
prior to or after auditor switch or otherwise. An
operational variable such as audit fees takes the
value of 1 if there is a reduction in audit fee
subsequent to auditor switch or otherwise.
(4)
Market Model
The standard Market Model (Sharpe 1964) is
used to estimate the expected returns and
average excess returns. The model expressed as
follows:
abbreviated to CHACQ and annual growth of
sales prior to the switch is abbreviated to
TURNGRTHB. Therefore, the larger the size of
the client's growth, the greater the demand for
the services of larger audit firms.
Financing. The operational variable to proxy
financing is estimated from newly issued debt
and equity ratios measured as "Long term debt
+ Equity)/Total Asset" abbreviated to CHFA.
Firms that change to larger audit firms are
predicted to exhibit a higher level of post-audit
changes in financing compared to ones that
change to smaller audit firms (Johnson and Lys
1990). We expect a positive correlation between
a firm's financing activity and the choice of
higher prestige audit firms.
Profitability: The profitability of the firm is
measured by two operational variables: average
returns on asset (AROA) and average cash flow
(ACFL). If poor returns and cash flows are
exhibited prior to the event, client firms are
likely to change to smaller audit firms. Therefore,
the profitability prior to the auditor change
should be positively correlated with auditor size.
Audit Risk: The audit risk relates to the
probability of an auditor issuing unqualified
opinion on materiality of mis-stated financial
statements. It is difficult to measure audit risk
objectively and accurately. No single proxy for
audit risk is considered adequate. However, it
appears to be related to client's business risk
(Simunics and Steins 1987). The business risk is
proxied by two operational variables namely,
client firm's size (SIZE) measured by total assets
and leverage (LEVR) both prior to and after
auditor changes. An increase in client size entails
a wider geographical dispersion and scope;
therefore clients need the services of larger
audit firms that have competitive advantage over
the smaller firms. Higher leverage client firms
would pose higher levels of financial risk,
therefore, it is likely that firms with higher risk
will engage the services of larger audit firms that
have greater expertise to analyse the situation
resulting in greater cr.::~ibility to the reports.
(3)y = cx. + If.. X + E ,J Jt J J J
Variable Measurements
The frequently used variables to proxy for the
firm's change in activities over time are asset
growth, asset size, turnover growth, changes in
acquisition, firm's leverage, changes in financing,
changes in operating cash flow, and average
returns on asset.
Expansion: Expansion entails increasing in
scope, geographical dispersion and volume of
client's activities. The corresponding increase in
quantity and complexity of accounting
transactions results in economies for larger
auditors, which provide high quality audit service
(De Angelo 1981). The expansion or contraction
is proxied by four operational variables namely
annual growth in total assets three years prior to
and three years after the switch: it is in~icated as
GRTHB and GRTHA respectively. Changes in
average acquisition of fixed to total asset is
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where
R
"
Pit-Pi,-l + D,
p t-]
x 100
wealth of the shareholders. To observe the
cumulative effect, cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) were calculated by summing up the AR,
over various time periods of interest:
Abnormal Returns Measures
Abnormal returns or residual returns are
prediction errors. The abnormal returns for a
given share price at any time period is the
difference between the actual returns and the
expected returns.
To estimate the parameters of the market
model, 60 monthly observations from outside
the analysis period (event window) are used to
avoid any misestimates of the market return
around the event dates. Market Model
parameters are adjusted for non-synchronous
trading problem caused by thin trading using
Scholes and Williams (1977) two lag and two
leads model.
C'_l
the rate of return of the ith stock on the
period t
stock price i at period t
stock price i at period t-1
Cash dividend paid to the shareholders
the constant average return while market
yields zero returns
beta estimate
Residual or random noise term assumed
to have property of U i, - (0-,0-2 )
the rate of returns on the market portfolio
(Composite Index) for period t C, and
C
t
_
l
are the values of Composite Index at
period t and t-l.
(6)
+K
CAR = L AR,
-K
Goodness of Fit Test
In normal regression analysis, F statistics can be
used to test the joint hypothesis that all
coefficients except intercept is zero. A
corresponding test in logistic regression that
serves the same purpose is based on Likelihood
Ratio. The functional form of Likelihood Ratio
is as follows:
Where the Sk is the standard error of the
coefficient and Bk is the coefficient of the
individual variable in the model.
Statistical Tests
Individual CoejJicient Estimates
To measure the relationship between the
exogenous variables, X, and dichotomous
response variable, individual estimate is tested.
Thus this test statistics is defined as
where
CAR K L = is the cumulative abnormal returns
, for cut-off point over the window
period from K to 1-
-K, ... +K refer to event window surrounding
audi tor changes.
x 100
C-C
,-l
~
U.I'
R
mt
P
"
Pit-I
D.
"
R
"
R
mt
(5)
The average excess returns are: where
N number of sample companies across the
sub-sample
AR.t average abnormal returns for companies
at period t
If AR, > a and statistically significant, it
indicates that the market on average reacts
positively to the event and thus increases the
In £ (j3) is the value of the likelihood function
for full (unrestricted) model and £(6*) is the
maximum value of the likelihood function if all
coefficients except the intercept (restricted), are
zero.
The method produces a statistics that follows
approximately a Chi-square distribution with k-1
(k being the number of independent variables)
degree of freedom if the joint null hypothesis is
true. If the alternative hypothesis were to be
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accepted, ALR becomes larger. If null hypothesis
is to be accepted, \.R < X2
RESULTS
Differences in Characteristics oj Switch and Non-
switch Firms
Table 1 presents the test results on the
characteristics of client firms that switched their
auditors and those of control firms that did not
switch their auditors over a period of five years
(2 years proceeding and 2 years after the auditor
switch). These are based on mean differences
respectively for (a) size, (b) turnover growth, (c)
returns on assets, (d) leverage of the firms, (e)
acquisition of fixed asset to total asset and finally
the liquidity position of the two groups. A simple
parametric test was used to observe the
differences in the firm's characteristics associated
with switch and non-switch groups. The results
suggest that both switch and non-switch groups
are distinctly different from one another in a
number of dimensions. For instance, the turnover
growth of firms that switched their auditors is
significantly larger than those that did not switch
auditors over the same period. The mean values
of the turnover growth over the 5-year (two
years prior and two after the auditor) period for
the two groups were recorded as 130 percent
and 70 percent, respectively. Meanwhile, the
average return on assets (ROA) of the two groups
over the same period is 3.4 percent for firms
that switched their auditors and 5.1 percent for
non-switch firms, though not statistically
significant (t-value = -1 A). The observed
differences on average acquisition of fixed assets
to total assets registered a marginally higher rate
for firms that switched auditors, for example,
the average acquisition of the two groups was 7.5
percent and 6.1 percent respectively. The
differences on asset sizes, leverage and liquidity
of the two groups were small and not significant
at the conventional level.
Determinants oj Auditor Switch
To provide an objective framework, the variables
for the determinants of auditor switch were
derived from agency theory and others in the
accounting literature. These are turnover growth
(TGROWTHB) prior to auditor switch and after
(TGROWTHA), average acquisition of fixed
assets to total assets (ACQ) , return on assets
(ROA) , average earning per share (EPS) , change
in audit fees (AUDF), management change
(MGTCHG), audit report both prior (RPORTB)
and after (PRORTB) the switch, firms leverage
(Leverage), liquidity of the firms (LIQ) and
audit type (AUTYPE)
Table 2 presents the results of the logistic
regression model explaining the determinants
of auditor switch firms. Initially 13 variables
were analysed using maximum likelihood
estimation procedure in stepwise logistic
regression based on centred data. In initial step,
stepwise regression iden tified GROWTHB,
GROWTHA, MGTCHG AND ROA as significant
variables. However, in the final step, the
procedure selected only three variables
(GROWTHB, GROWTHA, and MGTCHG)
which met the 0.10 and 0.05 levels of significance
for inclusion in the final model. The chi-square
value for overall model was 25 with 3 degrees of
freedom (significant at the .0001 level). Based
on the findings in Table 2, the joint null
hypothesis (that is, all the slope coefficients are
simultaneously zero) cannot be accepted. The
results support the notion that auditor switch
decisions of listed firms in Malaysia are mainly
determined by management change, and
turnover growth both prior and after auditor
change. The coefficient of the explanatory
TABLE 1
Simple parametric test for mean difference between switch and non-switch sample
Characteristic Mean Switch Mean Non-switch t-value
Size (RM) 617890 (000) 558508 (000) 0.28
Sale growth 1.30 .70 1.736*
ROA .034 .051 -1.451
Leverage 0.4325 0.4221 0.309
Liquidity 1.82 1.76 .259
AvAcq .075 .06 .78
* Marginally significant at 10 percent level
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variables are consistent with theory and findings
as reported in Burton and Robert (1967),
Linbeck and Rogow (1978) and Takiah et ai.
(1993). Burton and Robert documen t a
significan t association between change in
management and replacement of new auditor.
Consistent with Takiah et ai. (1993) in the
Malaysian context, this study could not establish
any significant relationship between qualified
opinion and subsequent auditor switch. It also
confirms the conclusion drawn by Takiah et ai.
(1993) that having profit or losses over the years
does not necessarily influence the switch of
auditor in Malaysia.
It must be noted that though qualified audit
opinion was most strongly associated with auditor
change in the US (Chow and Rice 1982),
Australia (Craswell 1988) and Hong Kong (Gul
et al. 1991), it is not a significant determinant of
auditor change in Malaysia. Similarly, the findings
could not establish any significant relationship
between audit fee and change in audit firm,
inconsistent with documented findings
(Eichenseher and Shields 1983); Bedingfield and
Loeb 1974).
Changes in Firm's Characteristics and Choice ofAudit
Firms
Table 3 summarises the descriptive statistics for
firms that switch to Tier 1 audit firms and those
that switch to Tier 2 audit firms. The results are
for mean differences of the following variables:
turnover growth, asset size, growth of asset,
leverage, returns on assets, financing activities
and average acquisition to total assets. There are
some noticeable differences. The average
turnover growth of firms that switched to Tier 1
auditor are comparatively higher than firms that
switched to Tier 2 auditor recording 54 percent
and 45 percent respectively, 2 years preceding
the auditor change.
Meanwhile, the average asset growth before
the auditor change for firms that switched to
Tier 1 audit firms is higher than firms that
switched to Tier 2 audit firms, recording at 50
percent and 42 percent respectively. And the
TABLE 2
Regression results on determinants of auditor switch
Vars p-value Model specification Percent
MGTCHG .05** Ch-Square 25.00** (p=.OOO)
TGROWTHB .07* Classification rate 64.00
TGROWTHA .012** Prediction Rate
Switch Group 72.00
Non-Switch Group 51.43
** significant at 5 percent level. * significant at 10 percent level.
TABLE 3
Test of differences between switch to tier 1 and switch to tier 2 firms
Characteristics
Turnover growth before
Size before ('000)
Size after
Asset growth before
Asset growth after
Leverage before
Leverage after
ROA before
Financing before
Financing after
Acquisition before
* 5 percent significant level
**10 percent significant level
84
Mean Mean t-value
.5455 .45 .27
624624 144632 2.52*
1108536 316577 2.35*
.506 .418 .3117
.597 .58 .049
.4436 .3496 1.7**
.4436 .37 1.6
.041 .05 .455
.452 .489 -.529
.421 .40081 .393
.07938 .0539 1.565
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size of the asset for client firms that switch to
Tier 1 are significantly larger than firms that
switched to Tier 2 audit firms. The average
acquisition before the auditor switch is recorded
at 7.9 percent for firms switching to Tier 1 audit
firms and 5.39 percent for firms that switched to
Tier 2 audit firms. Furthermore, firms that
switched to Tier 1 auditor exhibited higher
leverage than those that switched to Tier 2 audit
firms, significant at 10 percent over. The return
on assets for firms switching to Tier 2 audit firms
is higher, registering 5 percent over those
switching to Tier 1 audit firms recording 4.1
percent, but not statistically significant at the
conventional level. This finding suggests some
significant differences in the characteristics of
firms that switched to Tierl and Tier 2 auditor
firms respectively.
Table 4 summarises the results of changes
in firm's characteristics and choice of auditors
using logistic regression. Initially asset size, asset
growth, turnover growth, return on assets, change
in operating cash flow, leverage, change in
financing activities and changes in acquisition
were included in the analysis.
The stepwise procedure retained 4 variables
(LEVA, CHFA, GRTH, CHACQ which are
statistical signal) in the analysis. The results
indicate that the choice of auditor exhibits a
significant positive association with changes in
financing activities, leverage after the auditor
changes, and growth in assets before the switch,
while a significant negative association is reported
for change in acquisition. Though asset size for
client firms that switched to Tier 1 significantly
differs from client firms that switched to Tier 2
audit firm, the regression analysis fails to exhibit
a significant association between asset size and
audit choice. It is only significant at 21 percent
level. The coefficients of the variables are
consistent with theory except for turnover growth.
The negative coefficient for change in average
acquisition demonstrates that firms that switch
to Tier 1 auditor exhibit a higher level of average
acquisition to total asset during the pre auditor
change period compared to the post period,
consistent with the summary findings in Table 2.
The significant positive coefficient for
leverage after choice of auditor indicates that
higher leverage firms pose a higher level of
financial risk and increases in agency cost of
debt. To allow for this possibility, client firms
would engage the services of high quality (Tier
1) audit firms, who have greater expertise to
analyse the situation and give greater credibility
to the financial reporting than a small audit firm
would. Meanwhile, evidence of a positive
relationship between changes in financing
activities and choice of Tier 1 audit firms showed
that firms switching to Tier 1 audit firms exhibit
a higher level of post-auditor change financing
to increase the marketability of new securities
(both debt and equity). Furthermore, the
documentation of positive relationship between
firms' asset growth and choice of auditor suggest
that rapid growth entails substantial increases in
traction volume and accounting complexity, and
decentralisation of financial controlling system
thus requiring the services of larger audit firms
presumably having the expertise to provide
specialised services. The large audit firms do
have a cost competitive advantage over smaller
audit firms.
The summary results show that the average
acquisition for firms that switch to Tier 1 auditors
are relatively higher than firms that switched to
Tier 2 auditors, although the average acquisition
tends to decline for former group in the post-
switch period. Thus the joint-hypothesis (all the
slope coefficients are simultaneously zero) can
TABLE 4
Result of the logistic regression analysis
Variables
CHACQUI
CHFA
GRTHB
LEVA
TURNGB
SIZEB
p-value
.008
.03
.024
.048
.288
.221
Model specification
Chi-Square
Classification Rate:
Overall
Switch to Tierl
Switch to Tier2
Percent
17.46*
81.2
95.8
44.4
* significant at 5 percent level
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be rejected with a chi-square value of 17.46 with
a 6 degree freedom (p=. 0069). The model
correctly classifies for 81.2 percent. Earlier
studies on auditor choice have documented
inconsistent results on the association between
clients' characteristics and direction of auditor
change. The findings of this study are more
consistent with the hypothesis that firms that are
expected to raise debt financing demand the
services of high quality auditors to monitor
management activities that are detrimental to
the bondholders. The leverage was hypothesised
to be positively associated with the choice of
Tier 1 by Palmrose (l984), Eichenseher and
Shield (l986). The findings of a positive
coefficient for the change in financing activities
after the auditor change indicates that firms
which are expecting to issue securities in the
near future demand the services of Tier 1
auditors to attest credibility to the financial
reporting to market participants. This is
consistent with the findings of Carpenter and
Strawser (1971). They asserted that firms may
change auditors especially from a Tier 2 to Tier
1 auditor to increase the marketability of the
new securities (debt and equity issue). Consistent
with the study of Johnson and Lys (1990), this
study also documents asset growth before and
after auditor change, change in financing
activities and change in acquisition as the major
determinants of choice of auditors. However,
contrary to Johnson and Lys (1990), this study
documented a negative association between
change in acquisition and choice of auditor.
The finding of negative coefficient indicates that
pre-switch acquisition for clients firms that switch
to Tier 1 audit firms is comparatively higher
than clients firms that change to Tier 2 audit
firms.
The Wealth Effect of Auditor Switch Decision
Table-5 summarises the average abnormal returns
(ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
around the announcement day over a window of
81 days. Average daily excess returns and
cumulative abnormal returns were examined for
statistical significance using standard test
procedure. l Findings indicate that auditor
change on average are not associated with
significant price adjustments in Malaysia. Average
abnormal returns on the day of announcement
itself and the 3-day (-1 to +1) excess returns are
0.092 percent and 0.0461 percent respectively.
These are not statistically significant. The
cumulative abnormal returns over the days (-60
to -8) and (-8 to -1) are 0.018 and 0.62 percent
respectively. Post-announcement CAR over the
days (1 to 8) and (8 to 20) are 0.43 percent and
0.25 percent respectively. However, none are
statistically significant at the conventional level.
The client firms that switched to higher
(lower) quality audit firms experienced positive
excess returns at day zero of 0.12 percent and
0.69 percent respectively. The 3-day (-1 to +1)
excess returns for firms that switched to lower
quality audit firms recorded -0.29 percent.
However these are not significant at the
conventional level. The pre-announcement CAR
for client firms that switched to higher quality
audit firms over the days (-8 to -1) recorded a
net gain of 2.25 percent with a t-value of 1.84.
However, the CAR at post announcement period
over the days (1 to 8) and (8 to 20) declined,
recording cumulative abnormal returns of
percent and -2.00 percent respectively. But none
are statistically significant.
Market on average reacted negatively to
client firms that switched to a lower quality
auditor. The CAR over the day (-60 to -8)
recorded a cumulative 0.12 percent, which is
not statistically significant. However, pre-
announcement CAR over the days (-8 to -1)
recorded a net loss of 4.56 percent, which is
marginally significant at 10 percent level. CAR
in post-announcement period over the days (1
to 7) and (8 to 20) recorded a net gain of 1.68
percent and 0.13 percent respectively. However,
these are not statistically significant at the
conventional level.
The revaluation of auditor change type
within classes is more ambiguous and there is no
clear-cut direction of price changes. However,
overall it appears to suggest a common stock
price decline surrounding the auditor change.
The average abnormal returns on the day of
announcement and three days (-1 through +1)
excess returns for client firms that switched from
higher prestige to higher prestige audit firms
1. t·AR = ARt·O/SE(AR), t.CAR=CAR..L/SE (CAR..L), where SE(AR) = standard error of AR and SE(CAR) = standard error of
CAR and (K.L) = cut-off point from K to L during window period
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TABLE 5
Market reaction to auditor switch announcements
Trading day Full sample Tier 2-Tier 1 Teirl-Tier 2 Tier I-Tier 1 Tier 2-Teir 2
AR AR AR AR AR
-10 0.00146 -0.00296 -0.00294 -0.00275 0.00392
-9 -0.00147 -0.00053 -0.00812 -0.00126 -0.00344
-8 0.00019 0.00311 -0.014** -0.00034 -0.01363
-7 -0.00392 -0.00247 -0.01710 -0.00182 0.00713
-6 0.00210 0.00781 -0.00365 0.00015 0.01354
-5 0.0054* 0.00686 0.01126 -0.00173 -0.00436
-4 -0.00073 -0.00045 -0.019** -0.00380 0.02316
-3 -0.00019 0.01151 -0.02414 0.00186 -0.00629
-2 0.00390 -0.00093 0.021 ** 0.00034 -0.00480
-1 -0.00065 -0.00415 0.00005 -0.00291 0.00132
0 0.00228 0.00116 0.00690 -0.00161 0.00014
1 0.00095 0.00016 -0.00431 0.00111 -0.00295
2 -0.00042 0.00022 -0.00600 0.00180 -0.01657
3 -0.00087 -0.00484 0.00078 0.00133 0.0128*
4 -0.00213 -0.00326 0.00794 -0.00597 -0.00999
5 0.00340 0.00474 -0.00509 0.00548 -0.02116
6 0.00503 0.00514 0.022** 0.00403 0.01335
7 -0.00119 -0.00329 0.00202 -0.00001 0.00385
8 -0.00040 -0.00611 -0.00072 0.00820* -0.00621
9 -0.00302 -0.00306 -0.00536 -0.00556 0.00227
10 0.00038 -0.00347 0.00575 0.00371 0.00479
CAR
(-60 to -8) 0.00018 .0595* 0.00117 -0.031 -0.0358
(-8 to -1) 0.00618 .0225* -0.04568* -0.0098 0.00462
(1 to 7) 0.0043 0.00002 0.0168 0.0078 -0.02062
(8 to 20) 0.0025 -0.0288 0.00132 0.0168 -0.04628
• significant at 10 percent level
•• significant at 5 percent level
recorded at -0.161 percent and -.34 percent
respectively. These are small and insignificant.
The CAR over the days (-60 to -8) and (-8 to -
1) recorded a loss of 3.1 percent and .98 percent
respectively, which are not statistically significant.
The revaluation effect of auditor change from
Tier 2 to Tier 2 reported a weak negative market
reaction. Though significant positive and negative
abnormal returns were reported, none of the
day zero and three-day (-1 to+1) excess returns
were significant, recording at 0.014 percent and
-0.034 percent respectively. The CAR over the
day (-60 to -8) and (-8 to -1) registered a
cumulative return of -3.5 percent and 0.46
percent respectively for the Tier 2 to Tier 2
switch sample. CAR during the post
announcement recorded over the (1 to 8) and
(8 to 20) were -2.06 percent and -2.5 percent
respectively. However these findings are not
statistically significant.
To substantiate eXlstmg literature, further
analysis was done to determine whether firms
belonging to different levels of financial
condition, and switched audit firms resulted in
different market reaction. The financially healthy
firm that switched audit firms resulted in a
positive market reaction while financially
unhealthy firms that switched audit firms resulted
in a significant negative reaction surrounding
the auditor changes. For financially healthy firms,
the ARs for the day of announcement and 3-day
(-1 to +1) excess recorded at -0.5 percent and -
0.03percent respectively. Pre-announcement
CAR over the days (-60 to 8) and (-8 to -1)
registered a net gain of 0.63 percent and 1.53
percent respectively, but these are statistically
insignificant. Post-announcement CAR over the
days (1 to 8) and (8 to 20) were at 1.09 percent
and -1.15 percent respectively. While CAR for
financially unhealthy firms that switched auditors
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over the (-60 to -8) and (-8 to -1) recorded a
net loss of 15.8 percent and 1.4 percent
respectively. These are not statistically significant
at 10 percent level.
The revaluation effect of auditor change for
client firms that received a clean opinion
reported a weak positive market reaction
surrounding the auditor change. The ARs for
announcement day and 3 days (-1 to +1) were at
0.16 percent and .009 percent respectively. The
pre-switch CAR over the days (-60 to -8) and (-
8 to 1) are recorded as net gains of 1.5 percent
and 0.25 percent respectively. But none are
statistically significant. The post-switch CAR over
the interval (l to 20) reported a net gain of 0.11
percent. This is apparently consistent with Teoh's
(1992) contention that firms will experience a
positive reaction after a clean opinion than
qualified opinion, because high value retention
is more common after clean than qualified
opinion. But none are statistically significant.
Judging from the market reaction to auditor
changes, there is weak evidence that the market
indeed perceives auditor change as a signal.
Thus, auditor switch in this emerging capital
market conveys information value associated with
auditor change, but due to unknown reasons,
are not producing the significant effect normally
reported in some developed markets. The
demonstration of weak positive market reaction
reflects that an increase in firm value appears to
occur, and it is not a negative market reaction
documented in earlier literature from the
developed markets. Observing significant
cumulative abnormal returns for client firms
that switch to Tier 1 audit firms prior to auditor
change reflects a confirmation of quality shift
also observed in other markets.
CONCLUSION
The issue of auditor has been of interest to
academics, researchers and industry experts due
to its strategic implication for firm value,
credibility of financial reporting and monitoring
costs to curtail agency costs. Despite the concerns
shown in developed economies, little attempt
appears to have been made in Malaysia to
examine such an important issue in this fast
growing economy. Thus, this paper is a modest
first attempt that ascertains the determinants of
auditor switch decision and its effect on share
valuation of firms listed on the Kuala Lumpur
Stock Exchange. Logistic regression and event
study methods were used to analyse the data.
In general, findings appear to suggest that
auditor switch in Malaysia is determined by
changes in management and higher turnover
growth. Changes in firms' characteristics such as
asset growth prior to auditor switch, changes in
average acquisition of fixed assets to total assets,
finn's leverage, and changes in financing activities
were found to be significantly associated with
choice of quality differentiated audit firms.
Auditor change in general is not associated
with any significant price adjustment coinciding
with the announcement of auditor switch, despite
a positive trend in upvaluation of such firms.
However, once portfolios were formed based on
the auditor change types, different results
emerged. Firms that switched to higher quality
audit firms experienced positive (though weak)
market response while negative reaction is
observed for firms that switched to lower quality
audit firms. The revaluation effect from shifts
within classes exhibits weak negative abnormal
returns. An interesting difference in the findings
of this study and those of similar studies reported
in developed economies is that there is a weak
positive abnormal market reaction anomalous to
those reported in the developed economies.
This could be due to the positive development
at firm's level and significant upsurge in the
Malaysian economy, which had registered average
CDP growth of 8-9 percent over the test period.
Alternatively, there are some still unknown
missing variables confounding the results.
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